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Les droits des minorités : 
mythe ou réalité ? 
Preventing Discrimination and Positive Protection 
for Minorities: Aspects of International Law 
John P. HUMPHREY * 
Un pays est jugé par la façon dont il traite ses minorités, selon les paroles 
de Gandhi. L'auteur voit dans le respect de cette « règle de l'égalité » le symbole 
d'une maturité politique certaine. On n'a qu'à considérer l'histoire des guerres 
mondiales pour comprendre comment la façon dont on peut traiter certaines 
minorités peut affecter la paix des nations. L'élaboration du principe « d'auto-
détermination des peuples» après la guerre implique comme corollaire la 
protection des peuples minoritaires. 
Cette protection peut se faire sur deux plans, soit en cherchant à prévenir 
la discrimination, soit en élaborant des mesures positives de protection des 
minorités pour les aider à préserver leur identité. Sous quelles formes peut-on 
retrouver ces mesures de protection et quel en est l'impact réel, lorsqu'un pays 
entend davantage assimiler que protéger ses minorités. 
C'est à cette question que l'auteur tente de répondre. 
In an age when majority rule is apt to be considered the ultimate value, 
it is well to remember that, as the Mahatma Gandhi once said, a country can 
be judged by the way it treats its minorities. How a country treats its 
minorities is as good a test as any of its political maturity, tolerance and 
respect for the rule of equality. But there are other reasons why the way a 
country treats its minorities is important. President Wilson who, you will 
remember, wanted an article protecting national minorities in the Covenant 
of the League of Nations, once said that there is nothing more apt to disturb 
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the peace of nations than the treatment that is sometimes meted out to 
minorities. And well might he have said it, because he knew that the 
immediate cause of the First World War was the murder of an Austrian 
archduke by a member of a disaffected minority. We in our generation know 
that it was the unprecedented persecution of minorities in and by Nazi 
Germany that prepared the way for the Second World War. 
President Wilson was, you will also remember, a great believer in the 
political principle of the self-determination of peoples which became a kind 
of leitmotiv for the peace settlement after the war. The map of Europe was 
indeed redrawn in the light of the principle with the result that amongst 
other things the Austro-Hungarian Empire disappeared. It proved impossible 
however completely to respect the principle of one people one state one state 
one people. For however the new map might be drawn there were bound to 
be minorities within the new states some of which would belong to 
communities that in different circumstances had previously been majorities. 
Something needed to be done in the interest of justice and international 
peace to protect these minorities. It would seem indeed that if the principle 
of self-determination is worthy of respect, it carries with it the corollary that 
a people that succeeds in determining its political future has a duty to protect 
any minorities that remain within its jurisdiction. It was decided in any event 
that all those countries that had been called into existence by reason of the 
war, including for example Poland which was as it were resurrected, and 
countries the territory of which had been increased as well as certain ex-enemy 
states would be required to enter into treaties with the Allied and Associated 
Powers under which they would undertake to extend a measure of protection 
to their racial, religious and linguistic minorities. Other countries assumed 
similar obligations by declarations made on their admission to the League of 
Nations. These protections became part of the fundamental law of the states 
where the minorities resided and were put under the guarantee of the 
Council of the League of Nations. Thus began the international system for 
the protection of certain — not all for the system was discriminatory — 
minorities that operated in Europe in the period between the two wars. 
Notwithstanding the importance of the system for any study of the protection 
of minorities and the many lessons that can be learned from it, we do not 
have the time here to discuss it at any further length. I have mentioned it for 
two reasons. First because it had two quite different purposes : the prevention 
of discrimination on grounds of race, religion or language and what I myself 
call, for want of a better term, the positive protection of minorities, that is to 
say an obligation assumed by the state to provide certain services for the 
minority, such as minority schools, in order to help it preserve certain 
characteristics that distinguish it from the majority of the population or, 
more simply put, to help the minority preserve its identity. 
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This difference between the prevention of discrimination and the 
positive protection of minorities, which is nevertheless fundamental, is not 
always recognized or even understood. It is sometimes said — and it has 
been said at the United Nations — that if the human rights of everyone are 
respected without discrimination, there will be no further need for the 
protection of minorities. But the proponents of this view — and it is reflected 
in the Charter of the United Nations — quite forget that certain groups need 
something more than equality if they are to survive. 
The other reason why I have mentioned the League system for the 
protection of minorities is that while the United Nations could hardly be 
more committed to the prevention of discrimination than it is and always has 
been, it never took over the responsibilities of the League in the matter of the 
positive protection of minorities. It is generally assumed moreover — and 
the United Nations Secretariat has given its blessing to this — that because 
of changed circumstances the minorities treaties are no longer in force. 
There is nothing in the United Nations Charter about what I have called 
the positive protection of minorities ; nor indeed are minorities even 
mentioned in the instrument. Nor is there any mention of minorities in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights notwithstanding the fact that the 
Secretariat draft of this instrument did contain an article based on the 
League experience that would have required governments to provide racial, 
religious and linguistic minorities with the kind of facilities, including 
minority schools, which they must have if they are to preserve those 
characteristics that distinguish them from the majority of the population. 
The reasons usually given for the failure of the United Nations to assume any 
responsibility for the positive protection of minorities, apart from the less 
than serious one that if the rights of everyone are respected without 
discrimination, there will be no need to protect minorities, are that the 
system as it operated under the League was discriminatory — as it indeed 
was — and that it was abused by the Nazis. But the real reason for the failure 
of the United Nations to take over any responsibilities in the matter of 
positive protection was that most if not all states, did not and do not want to 
help minorities preserve their cultural identity. They want to assimilate 
them. This was especially true of the United States and other countries of 
immigration on this side of the Atlantic. And if it was true of the countries 
represented at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 it is even more true of 
the present membership of the Organization. In many third world countries, 
in Africa for example, the population includes a number of racially different 
tribes speaking different languages. These countries are primarily interested 
in what in United Nations jargon is called "nation building". 
26 Les Cahiers de Droit ( ' 986) 2lC.de D. 23 
Little wonder therefore that there is no mention of minorities in the 
United Nations Charter or the Universal Declaration or that there is very 
little likelihood of the world organization ever sponsoring a programme for 
their positive protection however much it is concerned with the prevention of 
certain kinds of discrimination. 
Minorities are mentioned however in the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. "In those states", says article 27 of this convention, "in 
which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to 
such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other 
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice 
their their own religion or to use their own language". You will note that 
article 27 is drafted in purely negative terms and that it imposes no duty on 
the states parties to perform any service such as the provision of separate 
schools or the use of minority languages in the courts or legislature. All that 
it says is that the state shall not erect obstacles that deny members of ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minorities their right, in community with the other 
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice 
their own religion or to use their own language. That is precisely what our 
Indian Act did for Indian women who marry non-Indian men. You are all 
familiar with the case of Sandra Lovelace, the New Brunswick Indian 
woman who married a non-Indian and because of that lost all her rights in 
her tribe notwithstanding the fact that under the Act if an Indian man 
married a non-Indian woman he brought her into his tribe. Mrs. Lovelace 
took her case to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, which is the 
implementation body set up by the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Strangely enough — and I think wrongly — the Committee did not decide 
the case on the ground that there was blatant discrimination based on sex, 
which is of course prohibited by the Covenant. But it did say that the Indian 
Act denied Mrs. Lovelace her right under article 27 of the Covenant to enjoy 
her own culture, to profess and practice her religion and to use her own 
language. Canada was therefore in default under the Covenant. The Indian 
Act has now been amended. 
Still another convention needs to be mentioned in this rapid review of 
the international law — or perhaps I should say the absence of international 
law — relating to the positive protection of minorities. It is the Genocide 
Convention the text of which was approved by the United Nations in 1948. 
The convention came into force in 1951 and has been ratified by a large 
number of states including Canada. This convention protects "national, 
ethnical, racial or religious" groups, including both minorities and majorities, 
against the worst treatment that can be meted out to them, namely, any of 
the following acts committed "with intent to destroy in whole or in part" 
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such a group "as such" : killing members of the group ; causing serious 
bodily or mental harm to members of the group ; deliberately inflicting on 
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction 
in whole or in part ; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group ; or forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. It 
would seem that much of what is called genocide by the media is not 
genocide as defined by the convention. Under the convention, there must be 
an intent to destroy a group in whole or in part and as such. The point I 
really want to make however is that however important this convention may 
be in the development of an international law of human rights, it imposes no 
duty on the contracting states to perform any positive service for minorities 
with a view to helping them preserve their identity. 
So much for the positive protection of minorities — or perhaps I should 
say so little. The prevention of discrimination is quite a different matter. In 
the case of the positive protection of minorities what the latter want is 
something more than equality. What they want in the case of the prevention 
of discrimination is equality. Now whatever else equality may mean, it 
certainly means that everyone, whether a member of a minority or not, 
should be protected against arbitrary discrimination on irrelevant grounds. 
That no-one should be subjected to such treatment is probably the best 
substantiated rule of the international law of human rights. 
It has been said of the United Nations Charter that references to human 
rights run through it like a golden thread. The same can be said of its 
references to discrimination ; for in nearly every place where it mentions the 
promotion of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms the words 
"without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion" immediately 
follow. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the two United Nations 
covenants, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, the Inter-American Convention on Human 
Rights, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 
the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the 
Unesco Convention on Discrimination in Education, the International 
Labour Organization Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of 
Employment and Occupation and many other conventions and declarations 
all prohibit discrimination on stated grounds. It is more than probable 
moreover that all forms of arbitrary discrimination on irrelevant grounds are 
now prohibited by the customary law of nations ; and the principle may even 
be part of the jus cogens — those rules of international law, that is to say, 
which are erga omnes and therefore basic in the interpretation and application 
of international law. 
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Not only are rules prohibiting discrimination now firmly imbedded in 
international law, there are few if any matters with which the international 
community has been more concerned since the Second World War than the 
prevention of at least one kind of discrimination, which is racial discrimi-
nation. There has been less interest in certain other kinds of discrimination 
including discrimination based on political opinion. 
You will find good definitions of discrimination in the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 
Convention on Discrimination against Women and the Unesco Convention 
on Discrimination in Education. All of these conventions relate to discrimi-
nation in particular fields. Paraphrasing them we can define discrimination 
in more general terms as any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference 
based on a prohibited ground that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or 
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural or any other field of public life. 
You will have noted that the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination 
in the United Nations Charter is a closed list : race, sex, language and 
religion. When however the Universal Declaration was adopted in 1948, this 
list was not only expanded but it became open-ended — in the sense that the 
list of prohibited grounds is not exhaustive. "Everyone is entitled", says 
article 2 of the Declaration, "to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration without distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status". You will have noted the phrase "without 
distinction of any kind such as" and the words "or other status". The lists of 
prohibited grounds contained in the two covenants, the European Conven-
tion and the Inter-American Convention are also open-ended. We can, I 
think, therefore concluded that international law prohibits any arbitrary 
discrimination based on grounds that are irrelevant in the particular 
circumstances. 
It is also true, on my reading in any event — and perhaps I am now 
impinging on Professor Beaudoin's jurisdiction — that the list of prohibited 
grounds of discrimination contained in article 15 of the new Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms is also open-ended. "Every individual is" 
says the article, "equal before and under the law and has the right to the 
equal protection and benefit of the law — Professor Beaudoin can perhaps 
tell us what those words mean — without discrimination and, in particular, 
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, religion, sex, 
age or mental or physical disability". You will have noted the words "in 
particular". We can thank the drafters of the Charter for having included 
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those two words, because otherwise Canadians would not be constitutionally 
protected against discrimination based on a number of grounds not speci-
fically mentioned in the Charter, including a number of grounds mentioned 
in international instruments to which Canada is a party. They include 
language, an internationally prohibited ground of discrimination so important 
that it is mentioned over and over again in the United Nations Charter, and 
political and other opinion, a prohibited ground mentioned in some of the 
other international treaties to which Canada is a party and which is of course 
an essential part of the democratic process. It would take us too far if I were 
even to mention the other respects in which our new Charter does not reflect 
our international obligations in the matter of human rights. One would think 
that the drafters of the Charter were unaware of the fact that there is such a 
thing as an international law of human rights and that Canada is bound by 
its rules. Here is an officially bilingual country that is a member of the 
United Nations the constitution of which prohibits discrimination on 
grounds of language. With great fanfare we adopt a Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms the purpose of which to enshrine the protection of human rights in 
our constitution. One of the articles enunciates the principle of equality and 
lists certain prohibited grounds of discrimination. But the list does not 
include language which is one of the four prohibited grounds of discrimi-
nation listed in the United Nations Charter. Why ? I can think of only one 
reason. When Canadians begin to talk about language they usually go 
completely hay-wire. 
